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CHAPTER 23 
Administration of Justice 
ALAN J. DIMOND 
A. THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
§23.I. Business of the full bench. The full bench of the Supreme 
Judicial Court continues to keep current with the more than 300 cases 
a year which it receives. Table I presents the figures.1 Of more than 
passing interest is the ability of the Court to maintain an average inter-
val of less than two months between a consultation, which immediately 
follows an argument, and a decision. 
TABLE I 
Full Bench Business of the Supreme Judicial Court 
1961-62 1962-63 1963-64 1964-65 
Cases decided 331 273 308 318 
Advisory opinions 2 2 4 4 
Rescripts without opinion 69 63 102 110 
Decision of trial court 
affirmed 214 175 207 119 
Decision of trial court 
affirmed with modification 9 4 13 12 
Decision of trial court 
reversed 80 78 67 77 
No decision by trial court 28 16 21 30 
Average interval between 
entry and consultation 97 109 100 113 
Average interval between 
consultation and decision 62 46 45 50 
Average interval between 
entry and decision 159 155 145 163 
ALAN J. DIMOND practices in Boston. He is Secretary of the Massachusetts Bar 
Association, as associate editor of the Massachusetts Law Quarterly, and author of 
The Superior Court of Massachusetts: Its Origin and Development (1960). 
§23.1. 1 The statistics in this chapter have been obtained from the offices of 
Richard D. Gerould, Esquire, Executive Secretary to the Justices of the Supreme 
Judicial Court; Chief Justice G. Joseph Tauro of the Superior Court; and Chief 
Justice Kenneth L. Nash of the district courts. The statistical year of the Supreme 
Judicial Court ends on August 31. For the other courts, the statistical year ends 
on June 30. 
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B. THE SUPERIOR COURT 
§23.2 
§23.2. Business of the court. The forty-two Justices of the Su-
perior Court now form a thinly deployed line to handle the growing de-
mands that come from both its civil and criminal sides. Criminal liti-
gation, in particular, is taking on added complexity and duration as a 
result of a new body of constitutional doc.trine which has opened or ex-
panded judicial inquiry into the legality of arrests, searches, seizures, 
and interrogations. Indictments resulting from investigations by the 
Massachusetts Crime Commission are also resulting in protracted pro-
ceedings, by way of both preliminary hearings and eventual trials. 
Finally, apart from the changing character of criminal trials, a general 
increase in all types of criminal cases, stemming from the continuing 
rise in the crime rate, is resulting in greater demands on the court's 
capacity. 
The growing demands from the civil side are reflected in Table II 
below. Of particular significance is the consistently rising profile of 
entries since 1962-1963. 
In measuring the total capacity of the court to cope with all this busi-
ness, civil and criminal, the waiting time for civil jury cases, reflecting 
the interaction of both sides of the tribunal, is a significant and useful 
index. As of June 30, 1965, the interval was more than 18 months in all 
counties, at least 24 months in 9 counties, and more than 30 months in 
4 counties. In Suffolk and Barnstable Counties the waiting time was 35 
months; in Bristol County it was 36 months. Meanwhile the legislature 
has adamantly refused to increase the membership of the Superior 
Court. 
TABLE II 
Superior Court Business (Civil) 
1961·62 1962-63 1963-64 1964-65 
Undisposed of cases, 
beginning of year 55,648 52,540 51,791 54,076 
Entries during year 40,830 39,400 42,449 44,831 
Dispositions during 
year 44,090 39,912 36,407 34,850 
Undisposed of cases, 
end of year 52,502 52,237 54,036 60,789 
Undisposed of law 
cases, end of year 44,470 43,571 44,991 51,268 
C. THE DISTRICT COURTS 
§23.3. Business of the courts. Tables III, IV, and V give certain 
significant figures of the business of the district courts. 
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TABLE I I I 
District Court Business 
(Other than Boston Municipal Court) 
1961-62 1962-63 1963-64 1964-65 
Civil writs entered 83,539 88,263 97,278 94,532 
Civil cases tried 
(other than summary 
process) 8,044 8,512 9,332 10,364 
Summary process entries 9,775 10,281 11,339 11,721 
Summary process trials 3,024 3,337 3,580 3,647 
Removals to the Superior 
Court 5,216 5,562 7,282 8,429 
Reported to Appellate 
Division 112 73 122 111 
Appealed to Supreme 
Judicial Court 13 13 10 13 
Small claims 75,564 79,238 76,573 84,579 
Criminal cases begun 304,254 337,957 336,558 381,401 
Criminal appeals 5,026 5,111 5,976 6,234 
Automobile cases 
(criminal) 177,889 208,923 213,700 223,199 
Juveniles under 17 9,754 11,199 12,521 12,714 
Parking tickets 
returned 1,101,198 996,585 986,566 1,078,034 
TAB L E I V 
Transfer Act Cases 
District Courts 
(Other than Boston Boston 
Municipal Court) Municipal Court 
1962-63 1963-64 1964-65 1962-63 1963-64 1964-65 
Transferred from 
Superior Court 10,679 11,367 11,326 
Tried in district 
courts 2,676 2,966 3,492 
Retransferred to 
Superior Court 
after trial 1,277 1,406 1,542 
All dispositions l 9,740 10,342 11,424 
Pending 6,279 7,390 7,265 
§23.3. 1 Agreements. trials, dismissals, settlements. etc. 
2 Data not available. 
S Data not available. 
1,818 1,575 1,730 
1,336 1,006 529 
360 259 240 
2,388 2,602 2 
1,405 378 3 
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TABLE V 
§23.4 
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support 
Act Cases in District Courts 
(Other than Boston Municipal Court) 
1961-62 1962-63 1963-64 1964-65 
Cases initiated 1,818 1,351 1,471 1,440 
Cases received from 
other states 636 666 862 823 
Amount collected $1,672,561 $1,966,578 $2,149,338 $2,449,372 
§23.4. Administrative authority in multiple-judge district courts. 
Until the 1965 SURVEY year the only special significance pertaining to 
the office of first justice of a multiple-judge district court has been the 
appearance of that justice's name on the writs and other processes of 
the court. Subject to paramount authority outside the court, adminis-
trative authority over its internal operation has rested on informal ar-
rangements which its several justices have made among themselves. 
Chapter 561 of the Acts of 1965 now names the first justice of the court 
as its "administrative head" and gives him the power to appoint tempo-
rary clerks, court officers, and probation officers, and to approve ap-
pointments by clerks of assistant clerks and temporary assistant clerks. 
The new act also declares that the senior justice "in time of service" 
shall be the first justice of the court. Nothing in the new act diminishes 
the general administrative supervision vested in the Chief Justice of 
the District Courts. 
§23.5. Removals to the Superior Court. As the burdens on the 
Superior Court have increased, efforts to require litigants in cases of 
moderate value to use the district courts have intensified. One such 
effort is the Transfer Act,1 which now authorizes the Superior Court to 
transfer for trial in a district court any Superior Court case in which 
the probable amount of recovery if the plaintiff prevails will,not exceed 
$2000. The 1965 SURVEY year saw the enactment of a companion mea-
sure, Chapter 377 of the Acts of 1965, which prohibits removals from a 
district court to the Superior Court in any case where the ad damnum 
of the writ does not exceed $2000. The new act also provides, however, 
that if after a district court trial the defendant still desires a trial in the 
Superior Court, he may, within ten days after notice of the decision or 
finding, remove the case to that tribunal. Upon removal, the case is 
then to be treated as a retransferred case under the Transfer Act. 
The impact of the Transfer Act on the operation of the Superior 
Court cannot yet be measured with precision. Available data seems to 
indicate, however, that the act is relieving the Superior Court dockets 
of a substantial number of cases. Yet how many of these cases would 
never have actually gone to trial in the Superior Court if they had been 
§2!1.5. 1 G.L., c. 2!11, §102C, as amended. 
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retained there is still a matter which requires further study and 
analysis.2 
§23.6. Venue in district courts. Until the 1965 SURVEY year Gen-
eral Laws, Chapter 223, Section 2, has required a trustee writ in a dis-
trict court (other than the Boston Municipal Court) to be brought in 
the county where all the trustees lived or had their usual place of busi-
ness and, within the county, in a judicial district where one of the par-
ties lived or had his usual place of business. In effect, this provision has 
prevented naming trustees in different counties. Since this limitation 
has not applied to cases in the Superior Court, some trustee writs which 
would otherwise have been brought in a district court have been 
brought in the Superior Court merely because of its broader venue. 
Chapter 454 of the Acts of 1965 has now expanded the venue of the 
district courts by permitting a district court trustee writ to be brought 
in defined district courts in the county where anyone of the trustees 
lives or has his usual place of business. 
The new act fails to make an express change in General Laws, Chap-
ter 246, Section 4, which states that in district court actions (other than 
in the Boston Municipal Court) "no person shall be held to answer as 
a trustee in any action ... in a county other than that where he dwells 
or has a usual place of business." This provision has, it seems, been 
impliedly amended by the new act. An express amendment should now 
be made while the matter is still fresh. 
Following the close of the 1965 SURVEY year, the venue of the district 
courts was again enlarged. By Chapter 752 of the Acts of 1965, all tran-
sitory actions, other than small claims proceedings and actions begun by 
trustee writ, may now be brought in specified courts in the county 
where anyone of the parties lives or has his usual place of business. 
Previously the venue in such cases was limited to the county of the de-
fendant's residence or usual place of business. 
§23.7. Juries of six. Use of juries of six in misdemeanor appeals 
in the district courts where such juries have been authorized has been 
handicapped by lack of funds to hire the additional court officers and 
other auxiliary personnel necessary for their operation. Any evaluation 
of juries of six must therefore be deferred. 
During the 1965 SURVEY year authorization for the use of juries of 
six in misdemeanor appeals in Bristol County was revised by legisla-
tion which eliminated such juries from the District Court of Fall River 
and added them to the District Court of Attleboro.1 They were retained 
in the District Court of New Bedford. 
D. OTHER MATTERS 
§23.8. Contingent fees. The 1962 ANNUAL SURVEyl referred to 
2 See Spangenberg and Neumann, Data Processing: A Modem Tool to Help 
Improve Judicial Administration, 50 Mass. L.Q. 81 (March, 1965). 
§2l1.7. 1 ACU of 1965, cc. 441, 498. 
§28.8. 11962 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §22.11. 
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the hint in Sullivan v. Goulette2 adumbrating the adoption of a rule 
regulating agreements for contingent fees. During the 1965 SURVEY year 
the hinted rule became a reality. The Supreme Judicial Court promul-
gated General Rule 14 ("Contingent Fees") validating contingent fee 
agreements if they are in writing and contain certain prescribed pro-
visions. Annexed to the rule is a form of an acceptable agreement. 
Specifically prohibited by the rule are contingent fee agreements in 
criminal cases and "in respect of the procuring of a divorce, annulment 
of marriage or legal separation." Contingent fee agreements in collec-
tion cases and in insurance subrogation claims, if "in accordance with 
usual practices," are declared to be valid and are excluded from the re-
quirement of a prescribed written agreement. 
Promulgation of the rule was preceded by the Supreme Judicial 
Court's issuance of a draft rule. Several bar associations submitted 
briefs containing suggestions for amendment. Accepting many of the 
suggestions, the Court adopted a final rule which, it is believed, the bar 
generally regards as fair, realistic, and practical. 
The rule defines a "contingent fee agreement" as one in which "com-
pensation, contingent in whole or in part upon the successful accom-
plishment or disposition of the subject matter of the agreement, is to 
be in an amount which either is fixed or is to be determined under a 
formula." It would seem that this definition was intended to replace 
prior case law on the subject, so that the old subtleties are now dis-
carded. Excluded from the definition of a contingent fee agreement is 
an agreement that the client "in any event is to pay the attorney 
the reasonable value of his services and his reasonable expenses and 
disbursements." Nothing in this provision would, it seems, prevent con-
sideration of the outcome of a matter in determining the reasonable 
value of an attorney's services.8 
§23.9. Contempt of court. The inherent contempt power of a 
court over conduct which interferes with its functions was affirmed 
during the past SURVEY year in the case of John Bath Co. v. Common-
wealth,1 which involved a corporation's discharge of a factory employee 
because he had refused to work from 7:30 A.M. until 9:15 A.M. during a 
period when he was on jury duty. Both the corporation and its execu-
tive who actually discharged the employee were cited for contempt. 
General Laws, Chapter 268, Section HA, declares that a discharge 
because of jury service will be treated as a contempt committed by the 
employer, but it is silent on the responsibility of a person who acts for 
the employer in effecting the discharge. Treating the statute, as far as 
it went, however, as merely a recognition of independent judicial 
power, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the statute did not limit 
a court's inherent power to deal with an interference with its functions. 
2344 Mass. S07, 182 N.E.2d 519 (1962). 
8 Muldoon v. West End Chevrolet, Inc., SS8 Mass. 91, 15S N.E.2d 887 (1958). 
§2S.9. 11964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 121!1, 202 N.E.2d 249, also noted in §§12.9, 15.11 
supra. 
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Any attempt to do so, it was said, "would raise a serious constitutional 
question." As a result, despite the absence of an express reference in the 
statute to the agent who effects the discharge, not only the employ-
ing corporation but also the executive was held to be subject to the 
contempt powers of the court. Then, affirming the action of the trial 
judge, who had concluded that the work requirements were unreason-
able and that both the corporation and the executive were accordingly 
guilty of contempt, the Supreme Judicial Court declared that the test 
of interference with the trial court was not whether the employee might 
have worked each morning without impairing his effectiveness as a 
juror but simply whether the work requirements risked impairment of 
that effectiveness. 
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